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THE RIGHTS OF TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION AND OF SUCCESSION
TO THE ESTATES OF INTESTATES, AND LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER
In the Direct Inheritance Tax cases recently argued in the
THEM.

Supreme Court of the United States involving the validity of an
Illinois statute, and in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania involving
the validity of a statute of that state, some stress was laid by counsel
for the commonwealth upon the argument that the above-mentioned
rights are not "natural," but are conferred by the state, which
can at its pleasure do away with them altogether, and therefore
can of course take any step short of this; for example, lay any
taxes, duties, or imposts upon them without regard to uniformity.
This position, if it can be maintained, must cause civilized communities to look about them, and I doubt not, in many of them,
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constitutional provisions amply and specifically preserving these
rights will be forthcoming in large numbers. But the organic law
should not be overstocked with provisions-many constitutions now
contain articles which have no place in them, and are really proper
subjects for legislative action. And I shall hope to be able to show
that the position taken on behalf of the commonwealth is utterly
untenable; and that these rights are quite as much entitled to the
benefit of the constitutional safeguards already existing, as are any
other rights of property or of transfer and acquisition of it.
As long as man has dwelt in civilized or semi-civilized communities, the right of succession has existed. Intestate succession
antedates 'testamentary succession, but both have long been fully
recognized rights, standing on an equal footing with other rights of
acquisition and transmission of property-and the right to transmit
by intestacy, or by will, is one of the ingredients of complete
"dominion"
over material things. If the literal sense of the
word "natural" is to be taken as that in which the supporters
of the doctrine that succession and testamentary disposition are not
"natural"
rights use it, their proposition is in strictness true.
There is no such "natural" right, nor is there a natural right to
transfer material things inter vivos, or any right of property in them
apart from possession ; and even coupled with possession, this
"natural" right is in a very precarious condition unless accompanied with power to maintain it. The right of a dog to his bone
depends strictly upon his possession of it. In the days of
"The good old rule,
The simple plan,
the

"natural

Let each one get who has the power
And let him lkeep who can "
" right:; were all that men had, and amounted, prav-

tically speaking, to very little. So far back that the date is
lost in the darkness of ages unillumined by history or tradition,
mankind emerged from this ultra natural state, if it ever existed,
and property rights, restig t.on onvention, were recognized as
essential to the well being and happiness of the race. Far from
being as complete, and as complex as they are to-day, they were
nevertheless the fo;zles et orz ines of those of our own times, which
are as much the result of evolution as is the horse of to-day from the
three-toed horse, or whatever it is called, of untold centuries ago.
All these rights are habitual-I-" second-natural," we might say,
the right of succession no more so and no less so than the others.
I shall not, in the course of this paper, cite authorities for every
statement that I shall make, but I shall carefully abstain from
making any statements which can be successfully challenged. And
I must refer those who are interested to the general and well-known
authorities on jurisprudence and kindred subjects.
It will not be disputed that the individualism of to-day is, historically speaking, of recent date. In fact, it is maintained by
some that the "family" is, or certainly ought to be, still the social
unit. Even the " robust title " of occupancy seems to have been
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by a family or group, and it is only with families or groups that
very early laws concern themselves. I do not mean that every acre
of land, every sheep, or other piece of property which came under
man's dominion, was seized upon by all the individuals of a groupthis is highly improbable, of course-but that as far as we can trace
property rights in their earlier stages, they seem to have been
enioyed by groups, and not by individuals. And as noticed by
Sir Henry Maine, the Russian village community of to-day very
closely resembles the ancient type. (These village communities are
most interestingly described in Wallace's Russia.) The head of the
family was clothed with power to dispose of and generally to
administer its property, but he was in no true modern sense the
owner; at his death these rights and duties devolvcd upon his
successor, as a matter of course, and the death of any head of a
family was, practically speaking, a mere incident without really
altering property rights. The head of such a family or community
was a sort of " corporation sole," holding his large power over the
goods and business of the clan vi-l/de oz2cii. While this was still'
true, and while on the death of any of these heads, the next in
succession of his family or clan succeeded to the property he had
controlled, it was not in the same way, or with the same idea that
obtains in succession to-day. It was rather a succession to rights
aml dties of a~iinistration. A taking up by A, so to speak, of the
general s/atts of B. The "u'niversum jus" of the Romans. The
power to designate these successors in this sense, seems to have been
exercised in India, Greece, and possibly Egypt.
It was from these beginnings that the rights of testate and intestate succesion, as we know them to-day, have been gradually
evolved, as the clan was disintegrated into the family, the family
into the individual by the solvent processes of time. Now, if there
be one thing which the courts have declared repeatedly to be
within constitutional protection, it is the right of persons sui.iuri.s
to make their own contracts, and the preservation of these contracts
inviolate when made. The liberty and sacredness of contract as
we know it to-day were utterly unknown in ancient times. And
while, in very early stages of society, there was a rudimentary
conception of contracts, there was no intervention of the law to
compel their performance, to say nothing of a denial of the right of
the community to violate them. It jumps at the eyes, that contracts as we know and protect them to-day, are the concomitants
of individualism, of a state of society evolved from but wholly
unlike that of early ages. And likewise, the "property " of which
a man is not to be deprived, etc., had no existence-I mean, of
conirse, the " h of property"-the "dominion."
As has
abeady been said, early ownership or possession, enjoyment of
things material, was by groups. "Ancient Law," says Maine,
" knows next to nothing of individuals."
In short, so far as history can enlighten us, ownership never was
usufructuary merely, and on the other hand it has become inzdividual
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comparatively late in the day. Transfer iner vir s by individuals
is quite as late as succession after death, and both have been for
many centuries before our modern constitutional law, ingredients
of the absolute right of property we so fully recognize, subject only to
the right of the state for p-blic purposes. It is, therefore, the
rankest absurdity to disting-ish between the right of testate and
intestate: -ucce_,sion. and other property rights, on the ground that
the latter are more "natural " and therefore more indefeasible.
Can it !,e f'rg'ie-; that tl;e provisions in the Constitution of the
United States forC.di,,g Congress or the States to deprive a man
of his property without 6ue: process of law, and the similar pro%-bions in the various *;ate -ontitutionz, still leave the door open
for the reduction of all prpertv rights to a mere usufruct ? Such
constitutional proVMisio., woild he almost idle, if that were so.
Deprive a man of the right to dispose of his property, and you have
well-nigh destroyed its xalue. And how is the right to "acquire
property" to be protected (an! expression in the Penns'.vania
Constitution) if others may be deprived of the right of parting
with it? So long as thc right of individual property is recognized
as within the protection of the constitution. so long is it iinpossible
in any just view for the law-making agencies of the government to
reduce that right to mere usufruct, or, indeed. possessory right;
for if the legistature can take away succession they can take away
transfers inter v oirs. This surely would not be held to be due
process of law. As has been strongly and convincingly said by
Mr. justice Matthews, tFtrta./o v. Caifornia. iio U. S. 516, " It
is not every act, legislative in form, that is law. Law is something
more than mere wil exerted as an act of power; " and the same
thing had been said long before by Mr. Webster, r:;:e'a,in the
Dartmouth College case. And, again, Mr. Ju.tice Miller. in Loa-;
--issoc. v. T ',,
k'' 2o Wall. 645, said "It must be conce:!ed that
there are such rights ih every free government b,'onJ th- control
of the state. A governrment which recognized no sich rights; a
government which held ihe lives, the liberty and the 1rloert x" of its
citizens subject at all times to absolute dispsitior! and imliirzited
control of even the most democratic depo~itary of power. .'," zftcr all
out a despotism " And the right of the legislature to do away
altogether with the succession, and escheat a man's ;:hole property
at the time o" his death, is expressly denied, obi/r,-, in JA:,a v.
U'DThtki,
161 Mass. rig. No authority slhould be required for
the proposition that confiscaqtion of property, either at a man's
death or during his life, as soon as he parts with it voluntarily or
involuntarily, is abhorrent to our constitutional principles, and
destructive of the very fomidations upon which our modern social
structure is built. That great jurist, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall,
has well said in F
v. Peck, 6 Cranch. 87 : "It may well be
v,'cic,doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not
prescribe some limits to the legislative power, and if any be prescribed, where are they to be found if the property of an individual,
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fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without compensation ?"
In the extremely able brief of argument for the appellants in the
Illinois cases in the Supreme Court of the United States, which it
has been my privilege to read, and which would make this article
a work of supererogation if it were accessible to the profession at
large, Messrs. Harrison, Guthrie and Prussing, say: '-When the
question is presented as to whether or not a state has the absolute,
unrestrained power to escheat or confiscate the property of a decedent, the court will have no difficulty in denying the existence of
any such arbitrary and despotic power."
And Mr. Guthrie said,
arguendo, "The position of our adversaries is that a state legislature has absolute power to deny the right of inheritance and of
testamentary disposition, and escheat whatever private property a
man may have accumulated as a result of a life's labor or a life's
economy. That such a policy, that the possibility of the exercise
of such a power, would take away all incentive to labor, shake
society to its very foundations, and destroy our civilizations, cannot
be doubted for a moment. Is there such legislative power in any
of the United States? Can it be asserted that the legislatures of
the states can deprive us of rights which have been recognized and
enjoyed by our race for centuries before the Continent was discovered ? There is not a civilized, if indeed there be a barbarous,
state in the world to-day that dous not recognize the rights of
inheritance

and of testamentary

disposition . . . It

is a right

exercised everywhere sl)ject only to the limitation which we all
recognize and concede, that the government may step in on grounds
of public policy and ordain that natural heirs shall not be disinherited or that property shall not pass to aliens or to foreign
corlporations, or to such corporations ::s it deems should not be
allowed to hold or accunrlate property. The state in making such
regulations derives its power not from the idea that the property
eschieats and belongs of right to it on the death of the decedent,
nor from any notion that the ownership is in the state, but from
that s/qrma lex which justifies every society in reasonably protecting itself according to its public policy-a power it may exercise
as to th- property of the living as well as of the dead."
This
could not be better put. It is full and completely unanswerable.
Mr. Guthrie states that his opponents urge that he has shown no
- autho-ity -- i. c., adjudicatcd case-:br the proposition that
these rights are fundamental and natural, and beyond the power of
the le-'slaiure to deny, but only cites historians of the law. His
reph th't this is for the obvious reason that no legislature has ever
attcmited to deny the right and that, in the words of Judge Patterso, in V:,vioruc's Lcssee v. D011r.zJcc, 2 Dall. 304, 310, " Such an
act would 1;e a monster in legislation, and shock all mankind" is
quite sufficient. lut the taunt was a clinching argument again't
the taunter. If ic!,/iis::ansare not the best authorities as to the
origin ,,nd fndamentat character of rights, who are? Certainly
not judges who may at this late (late arbitrarily and in defiance of
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history assert that as afae, which is not a fact, and this is a good
illustration of the prevalent ''case-law."
How few to-day deserve
the compliment paid by the late Judge Cadwalader to Andrew
Hamilton, the great lawyer of Revolutionary dais, when he said
that Hamilton asserted the law to be thus and so from principlhs,
and cited cases as illustrations
The whole argument on the other side is a dish of false premises
garnished by a non sequitur or two. It is a false premise that these
rights are not as "natural" or " fundamental" as other property
rights. Conceding, however, these premises, it is a non seynitur
that the legislature can destroy them or abridge them unequally.
Again, cohceding that the legislature can destroy or abridge them
unequally-a false premise-it is a non sequiltur that it can pass a
law of escheat under the guise of a revenue or fax law. In short,
the whole contention is, to use the words of Austin on another
subject, "an absurdity which has no example, and which no
example can extenuate.
Lucius S. Land.i"fh.
Philadelphia, March, iSgS.
INTERNATIONAL LAW; HUSBAND AND WIFE; FRENCH RULE OF
COMMUNITY GOODS.
DeVicos v. Cus/ie-, 14 Law Times Rep.

2o6 (Feb. 3, 1898), raises an interesting and most novel question.
Two citizens of France intermarried at Paris in 1854. At the
marriage they were asked, as the French law requires, whether they
had made any marriage contract, and they d.-clared that they had
not, so that, under the French law, community oi' goods obtained
between them. In 1863 the couple removed to England and the
husband became a naturalized Englishman.
He amassed a considerable fortune, and at his death in 1897 the question arose as to
what passed under the will.
Kekewich, J., after stating that there were no decisions but only
dicta on the question, said : "These spouses were French pe(ople
and they intermarried in France. It was open to them to m:irry
according to one or more regulations affecting matrimonial property-1)roperty which they might acquire during coverture. They
had some choice in the matter. They might have elected to marry
according to the rule as to community of goods, a rule that was
appl;cable to their proprietary rights in the absence of any exprcss
election to the contrary; and that was, so far as was known, what
took place. ....
"
Since, then, they married under the community of goods rule,
there was nothing about their change in domicile to alter the rule
concerning their property. At no time was there a surrender on
the part of.the wife of any of the rights to which she was entitled
under the matrimonial contract. Nor was there any law to force
her to such a surrender. Hence the court held that the husband
by his will disposed only of such property as was properly his, and
the wife's rights were unaffected.

NOT..
BILL OF EXCHANGE; NOTICE OF DISHONOR. The Court of Appeal
of England has decided in the case of IFieleing &- Co. v. Cor;y et al.,
I Q. B. 268 (Nov. 13, 1897), that in giving notice of dishonor,
provided notice reach the defendant in time, it is immaterial that
there is a break in the chain of notices. In reaching this conclusion the court disregarded precedents and relied on the Bills of
Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 6x) s.49, sub-ss. 12 (b.),
13. A very strong dissenting opinion is filed by Collins, L. J., in
which the authorities are stated and some trenchant criticisms given
of the decision of the majority. He also points out that even under
the Act of 1882 the notice was ineffective. The question arose
under the following state of facts: A bill of exchange had been
left for collection with the Cardiff branch of the Gloucester County
Bank. It was forwarded to the L. & W. Bank, in London, by
whom it was presented for payment, and was dishonored. The
notice of dishonor was sent by mistake to the wrong branch of the
Gloucester County Bank. On the next day, the mistake having
been discovered, the London Bank telegraphed notice of dishonor
to the branch from which they had received the bill. All subsequent notices, including that to the defendant were sent in due
time. The court held that sufficient notice of dishonor had been
sent by the London Bank to comply with the provisions of the Act,
viz. : (Sub-s. 5) Notice may be given in writing or by personal
communication and in any terms which sufficiently identify the bill
and intimate that it has been dishonored bynon-acceptance or nonpayment. (Sub-s. 12). Notice may be given as soon as the bill is
dishonored, and must be given within a reasonable time afterward.
The court in its opinion denied any intention of overruling
Cloa'e v. BayeVr, 12 M. & W. 51 (1843) ; Prince v. 0-ientalBank
C°1Goaywi0, 3 App. Cas. 325 (1875) ; and the cases which hold
that there must be no break in the chain of notices, but rested the
decision upon the ground that "under the circumstances it was
impossible to say that there was a failure in one of the links of the
chain of notices."
It has been held that if the fact of laches on the part of the holder
of the bill is established, prior endorsers are discharged : Smi/h v.
Alillet, 2 Camp. 208 (1809) ; Turner v. Zeech, 4 B. & A. 451
(1821) ; and that where a bank is giving notice, each of its
branches is to be considered a separate holder: Clode v. Bayler
(sipra).
MALICE IN PREVENTION OF CONTRACT;

"CONSPIRACY;

"

INJUNC-

May A
with impunity advise B not to enter into a contract with C ? There
seems to be doubt of this in two cases. First, when A joins with
others in his action.
he "advice"
by combination becomes
a "conspiracy" and may be enjoined before its object is accomplished, or may be punished afterwards. Second, when A is
actuated not by an honest conviction as to the good results of his
TION; HiOPKINS V. OXLEY STAVE Co; ALLEN V.

FLOOD.

NOTES.

advice, but by wicked and malicious motives. His advice, then,
becomes "oppression of third persons" or "unwarranted interference in the conduct of another's business" and is punishable as
such. The first of these "rules" has recently been enforced in the
United States; in England the second has been denied.
In Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed. 912 (U. S. C. C. A.,
Eighth Circuit, November, 1897), a Cooper's Union was fighting
the use of certain barrel hooping machinery, and in combination
with another labor union proposed to notify the plaintiff's customers
and other persons not to purchase machine-hooped barrels, and to
induce members of labor organizations generally and their sympathizers to refuse to buy provisions or other commodities which were
packed in such barrels. The majority of the court pronounced this
an unlawful conspiracy and confirmed the Circuit Court injunction.
There was no evidence of intended violence, yet the court, per
Circuit Judge Thayer, uses this rather remarkable language in reference to it :
"It may be conceded that, when the defendants entered into the
combination in question, they had no present intention of resorting to actual violence for the purpose of enforcing their demands ;
but it is manfest that, by concerted action, force of lltnbers anYl by
exciting the .fears of the timid, they did intend to conzpel litany
persons to submit to the dictation of others in the management of their
private business affairs" (italics ours).
The court was apparently influenced by the fact that the "conspiracy" was directed toward an object unreasonable and opposed to
public policy, being intended to deprive the public of the benefits
of labor-saving machinery. Says the majority opinion:
"If a combination to that end is pronounced lawful, it follows,
of course, that combinations may be organized for the purpose of
preventing the use of harvesters, threshers, steam looms and printing presses, typesetting machines, sewing machines and a thousand
other inventions which have added immeasurably to the productive
power of human labor and the comfort and welfare of mankind"
(p. 921).
It follows, then, as nearly as can be gathered from this language,
that equity interference with such a combination is largely because
the equity judge considers the workmen to be unreasonable in
their demands, and the irresistible inference is suggested that an
injunction may or may not lie, according as the merits of the particular controversy appear to him in whose power it is to issue the
injunction.
Conclusions such as this lead others than populists and labor agitators to declare that "government by injunction" substitutes for settled principles of law the whims of the
Eastern cadi, for the Anglo-Saxon trial by jury the ukase of a Federal judge issued on the ex p2arte representations of a corporation
attorney.
The words of Lord Herschell in Allen v. Flood [1898]; A. C. E,
Sr18, are of application here: "I can imagine no greater danger to
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the community than that a jury should be at liberty to impose the
penalty of paying damages for acts which are otherwise lawful,
because they choose without any legal definition of the term to say
that they are malicious. No one would know what his rights were.
The result would be to put all our actions at the mercy of a particular tribunal whose view of their propriety might differ from our
own."
And if it would be dangerous for ajury to have such power,
how much more dangerous for the judge without the jury to have
the punishment of such actions by writs of injunction and commitments for contempt. This, no doubt, would be the conclusion of
Circuit Judge Caldwell, who dissented in I, kins v. Oxey Stave
Co. His opinion is one of the most unique and able we have seen
for many a day, and we should like to quote from it at length if
space allowed. He refers to the historic cases of William Penn,
the Seven Bishops and others to show " that it was through the
good sense, courage and love of liberty of the sturdy English juiries
who stood out against the judges, that the right of the people to
assemble for lawful purposes, and the right to address them whenthey were assembled, the right of free speech, and the freedom of
the press, and the right of petition for the redress of grievances,
were-secured to the English people" (p. 928). With reference to
the theory that combination per se makes a lawful act unlawful,
Judge ('aldwell says: " Under this asserted rule, what a man, when
acting singly, may lawfully do, he may not do in concert with his
neighbor . . . What each individual member of a labor organiza-

tion may lawfully do, acting singly, becomes an unlawful conspiracy
when (lone by them collectively. Singly, they may boycott;
collectively, they cannot. The individual boycott is lawful,
because it can accomplish little or nothing. The collective boycott is unflaN ful, because it might accomplish something."
And
later the judge remarks . . . "All great improvements in social

conditions [are] achieved by the organization and collective action
of men."
The case of Allen v. Flood [1898], A. C. i (Dec. 14, 1897),
did not involve directly the question of combination or (onspircy,
as several of the judges were careful to say, though the questions
discussed were very similar to those of the Stave Company case,
and the decision in Temb)erlon v. Russell [I893], I Q. B. 715,
which was a case of combination, was expressly disapproved.
In Temperlon v. Russell a trades union committee, by threatening
to call out their employes, induced third parties not to enter into
contracts with the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff had a
right of action against the members of the committee for maliciously conspiring to injure him by preventing persons from having
dealings with him. The decision was largely founded on Baoaen v.
Hall, 6 Q. B..D. 333 (i88i), and Lumley v. Gye, 2 E & B. 216
(1853)-

All these cases must now be regarded as very much shaken by
Allen v. Flood. In the latter case, two shipwrights, Flood and

NOTES.

Taylor, who had formerly been guilty of working on both wood
and iron, a practice opposed by the trades unions, were discharged
by procurement of Allen, a '"walking delegate" of the Boilermakers' Union. The jury found that Allen had "maliciously"
prevented these shipwrights from obtaining further employment, and
thus from pursuing their occupation, and all the courts up to the
House of Lords held, with very little dissent, that Flood had a right
of action. There was no question of breach of contract, as Flood was
hired subject to discharge at any time, but the lower courts held
with Tempero;; v. Russeli " that it is immaterial that the act induced
is not the breach of a contract but only the not entering into a contract, provided that the motive of desiring to injure the plaintiff,
or to benefit the defendant at the expense of the plaintiff, is
present. "
At the hearing before the Lords, eight of Her Majesty's judges
were invited to sit, and assist by their opinion the determination of
the Lords. Six of the eight were for affirming the lower court, but
the Lords by a very large majority reversed it. The reasons
adduced by those judges in favor of affirmance may be given in the
words "every one has a right to the free pursuit of his own
occupation."
Lord Herschell sums them atterup in this way: " I
do not doubt that everyone has a right to pursue his trade or
employment without ; molestation '.or ' obstiuction,' f those terms
are used to imp/v some act iW itseif -wrongfh/." The noble and
learned lord points out that most of the cases cited for plaintiff
involve nuisance, trespass, violence, obstruction or some other
act which would be wrongful without reference to its effect on the
plantiff's trade or occupation. If B fires guns by A's decoy, or
overturns by cannon shot a canoe load of negroes going to A's
ship, or frightens bak to their honcs scholars on their way to A's
school, he will be liable, though A keeps the decoy not for trade,
but for sport, though the vessel is a pleasure yacht and not a trading
ship, though the building from which are frightened away those
proceeding thither on the public highroad, should be not a school
but only a dwelling-house.
Lord Davey thus disposes of the question of malice: " An employer may discharge a workman (with whom he has no contract)
or may refuse to employ one, from the most mistaken, capricious,
malicious or morally reprehensible motives that can be conceived,
but the workman has no right of action against him. it sems to
me strange that the principal who does the act is under no liability,
but the accessory who has advised him to do so, nithout any
otherwise wrongful act, is under liability."
Lord Macnaghten says that it is urged that disapproval of the
decisions in Ten,,5erlon v. Russell and kindred cases "will be attended with dangerous consequences as extending the power of
tradcs unions or combinations beyond the limits which these cases
laid down. I am not insensible of the truth of the obseration
that a certain amount of restraint which these cases introduced will
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be removed . . . If the force of combination should be
harshly or oppressively used-if it should be used in circumstances
in which right-minded men should deplore its use-it must be observed that those against whom combination is so employed have
precisely the same liberty of action for resisting oppressive measures,
and for causing those who use them to desist from that course of
action. "
This brings us almost exactly to the question discussed in our
former case-opkins v. Oxley Stave Co. It seems that the exercise of the wide judicial discretion employed in the American case
might, to advantage, have been a little circumscribed by some
such considerations as those advanced by Lord Macnaghten.
Another quotation from Lord Herschell will enforce what we mean:
"The truth is, this suggested test makes men's responsibility for
their actions depend on the fluctuating opinions of the tribunal,
before whom the case may chance to come, as to what a rightminded man ought or ought not to do in pursuing his own interests.''
GOVERNMENT

CONTROL

OF

TRANSPORTATION

CHARGES;

THE

In Sm,/h v. Ames, an appeal from
the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska,
decided March 7, 1898, the United States Supreme Court held the
Nebraska Maximum Freight Tax unconstitutional. Mr. justice
Harlan, delivering the opinion of the court said: "A state enactment . . . establishing rates for the transportation of persons or
property by railroad that will not admit of the carrier earning such
compensation as under all the circumstances is just to it and to the
public, would deprive such carrier of its property without due
process of law and deny to it the equal protection of the laws,
and would therefore be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment."
In order to determine whether any given rates are or are not such
as to allow the carrier reasonable compensation, the basis of calculation must be "the fair value of the property" used by the
corporation.
"And in order to ascertain that value, the original
cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amtount and market vale of its bomlud and stock
(italics ours), the present as compared with the original cost
of construction, the probable earning capacity of the property
under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration, and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in
each case."
Advocates of the kind of legislation here pronounced
void have pointed out that the method of calculating which takes
into account "the market value of the bonds and stock" involves
reasoning in a circle, because such market value depends upon an
earning capacity determined by the rates charged-the very thing
it is proposed to restrict. These advocates also occupy themselves
in wondering what rates the legislature can prescribe, since any
NEBRASKA FREIGHT TA-X CASE.
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imaginable tariff must necessarily fail to give a net profit to some
road. They ask whether, under this decision, it would not be to
the advantage of the wealthier railvays to keep one road always on
the verge of bankruptcy, so as to require high rates for that road
and thus for all? Or, they ask, is it supposed that a separate tariff
could be established for each railway, based on " what the traffic
will bear," the maximum rates being such as to allow a comfortable
profit on more or less watered stock? Finally, they ask, when the
decision is boiled down to its real essence, does it not mean that
the legislature may decide whether rates shall be regulated, but
that the courts must do the regulating? And at this juncture they
quote fron! Chief Justice Waite, in Nu v. .llinois, 94 U. S. 113,
133, 134 (1876),*" . . . it has been customary, from time immemorial, for the legislature to declare what shall be a reasonable
compensation . . . We know that this is a power which may
be abused, but that is no argument against its existence. For protection against abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the
polls, not to the courts."
On the other hand, it is asserted that capital invested in enterprises of the greatest moment, not only to particular states but to
the country at large, cannot be exposed to the caprices of populistic legislatures in Western communities. These legislatures may
pass laws commanding the railwavs to haul without compensation,
or practically that, and thus rob their owners as effectually as
Richard I. did the Jews.
The question is most puzzling. In i89o Chairman Crocker, of the
Committee on Railway Legislation, speaking to the second annual
convention of railroad commissioners held at Washington, wondered
"whether it is or is not true that the states, by allowing their railroad corporations to take part in interstate commerce, have thereby
parted with all but a shadow of control over the subjects of their
creation . . . . ," and still the wonder grows. It is possible that
the end will come through general corporate bankruptcy followed
by state ownership of the roads. As Mr. A. G. Warner says (Railroad Problems in the West, VI. Pol. Sc. Q. 89 Mar. 189i). "It does
not strike a legislator with very profound awe to tell him that a certain
law will drive the roads into bankruptcy. He has seen many roads
in that condition in consequence of the whims' or selfish interests of
their managers, and he fails to be appalled at the idea that a few
more of them may become insolvent through his attempt to act in
the interests of the general public."
STATUTE LAw REVISION IN ENGLAND.
A new edition of the
revised statutes of England has just been completed. It is in
twelve volumes and takes the place of ninety-one volumes of the
former edition. The Lord Chancellor recently stated the steps
taken in such revisions. "The work is done, in the first instance,
by the most competent and experienced draftsman we can obtain,
and his work is checked by a second draftsman. The drafts are

NOTES.

then referred to every department which appears to be affected by
any of the repeals proposed, and are afterwards supervised by the
Government draftsman. They then come before the Statute Law
Committee, consisting of persons of the greatest skill and experience
in departmental matters. The Bill is finally submitted to the Lord
Chancellor of the day, who satisfies himself respecting it and introduces it to the House. During its passage it is subjected to the
special ordeal of a Joint Committee of both Houses, comprising
what I may be allowed to call the highest authorities in either
House on the questions likely to be raised in a measure of this kind.
It is the business of the Joint Committee to certify that no amendment of the law is contained in any Bill referred to it."
The
Revision Bill is in the hands of that Committee.
ANTI-TICKET SCALPER'S LAW IN NEW YORK.
In view of the
bill now pending before Congress in reference to ticket-scalping, it
is interesting to note the opinion of a New York court on the New
York law on the same subject.
Chapter 5o6 of the laws of 1897, known as the Anti-Ticket
Scalper's Law, forbids the selling of any tickets except by the authorized agents of the owners or consignees of vessels or of railroad companies upon which the transportation purports to be sold,
and requests written authority from a transportation company in
order to constitute an agent. It is, in form, an amendment of the
Penal Code, offences against it being punishable by imprisonment
in a state prison.
Under this law one Tyroler wao- arrested for selling a ticket
from New York to Noroik, Va., without being a duly authorized
agent. i!,/he,as crus was refused, and from that decision the relator appealed.
( The _'cq:l/ ex i-el. 2,',a/ v. the lWtr,,
e, Mke
Ci6 Prisoiy,,
etc., Mo. Decided Feb. 25, 1898.) The relator
admitted he was not an authorized agent of the companies over
which the ticket was sold, but he contended that the act was unconstitutional in that it violated §§ i and 6, art. i, of the Constitution of New York, and § I,art. i, of the Constitution of the
United States.
Mr. Justice Patterson held that the act did not contravene any
of the constitutional provisions invoked. In the course of the
opinion he said : "It will scarcely be questioned that it is within
the power of the legislature of the state to pass laws to prevent,
within its territory, the commission of frauds upon passengers;
and it cannot be denied that the particular provisions of the chap-ter referred to are directed to that end."

"The statute does not infringe any of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the deprivation of
a person of his liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to him the equal protection of the law secured by that
Constitution. This act does not deprive a person purchasing a
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railroad ticket fromn a carrier of his special property in that ticket ;
nor does it impair the obligation of a contract, for the ticket is
not the contract of carriage, nor does it confer an exclusive
privilege upon any class of persons
Nor is there any exclusive privilege accorded by this act in the authorization of agents
to sell tickets. There is no discrimination against any class of citizens; the provision that the corporation shall sell only through its
agents, is merely a declaration that the corporation itself shall sell
its tickets . . . Tickets can only be sold by individuals acting
as the agents of the corporations or other carriers, and it is no discrimination causing an unequal operation of the law for the corporate body to select the persons who shall act as its agents
There is no monopoly in the business of selling tickets accorded
by that feature of the act."
The conclusion is that the purpose and scope of the law are
within the police power of the state for the protection of persons
seeking transportation, and that the law is free from the constitutional objection taken to it.
(NOTE-We are indebted for the report of this case to the New
York Evening Post.)
PRINCIPAL AND BAIL;

POWER OF BAIL; OFFICE OF BAIL PIECE.

The right of bail to remove principal from one state to another
has recently been considered and sustained by the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania. One
who had been arrested upon a capias in an action of trespass,
brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, gave
bond in the usual condition, but, after judgment against him in
that action, did not pay or surrender. His bail took out a bail
piece, duly certified by the judge and prothonotary, and by endorsement authorized the respondent in the present writ to seize
and surrender the defendant.
In rursuance of such authority
the respondent took the petitioner into custody at St. Louis, in the
State of Missouri, and by force brought him to Pittsburgh, in the
State of Pennsylvania, for delivery to the sheriff. The defendant
sued out a writ of habeas corus in the Federal Court, alleging
that he was a citizen of Missouri ; that no legal proceedings, if any
such could have been had, were begun to warrant any such arrest
in the State of Missouri, and that contrary to Article V, of the
Constitution of the United States, he was deprived of his liberty
without due process of law. The opinion of the Court, Buffington, J., was as follows:
"Of late years we have grown so accustomed to the proceedings
by requisition that we have come to regard it as the only means by
which a person can be arrested and removed from one state to
another. An examination of the authorities, state aud federal,
shows, however, that under certain circumstances bail have the
right to arrest their principals wherever they find them and remove
them to the forum from which they have been released and to
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which they have obligated themselves to surrender. By these authorities, to which we shall refer, it would seem settled that when
one is arrested and bail is given, such principal is regarded as delivered into the custody of such bail; that the bail has the right
to arrest or take the principal into custody at any time or place in
order to surrender him ; that such arrest is not made hy virtue of
the process of a court, but is the exercise of a right arising from
the relation between the parties; that a bail-piece is not the authority for such an arrest, but is simply evidence of the relationSuch being the distinction clearly
ship between the parties.
drawn in the decisions, it will at once be seen that there is a fundamental difference between the right of arrest by bail, and arrest
under warrant where such right to arrest is based upon a court process, which pAr sr can have no extra-jurisdictional power or efficacy. The latter right depends upon the process of the court
which issued it, and necessarily such process confers no power
outside that jurisdiction. The former arrest-viz., of principal by
bail-is based upon the relationship which the parties have estab-lished between themselves, and consequently, as between the parThe court,
ties, is not confined to any locality or jurisdiction."
after reviewing a number of cases, gave decisive effect to Taylor v.
Tain/a,, i6 Wallace 371, and remanded the petitioner to the custody of the respondent. In rc Pe/i/ion of Von tier Ahe, 7 Pa.
Dist. Rep. 132.
John IV. Paton.
SLEEPING CAR CO'ANY; LIABILITY FOR Loss OF PASSENGERS'
BAGGAGE.
In Be/,en v. Pt/. Pal. Car Co., 43 S.W. 22 (Court of

Civil Appeals of Texas, Nov. 17, 1897), plaintiff had taken passage
on defendant's sleeping car and entered his berth, leaving his valise
by the side of it, as is customary with travellers. When he arose
the next morning about two hours after the train had arrived at its
destination, the valise was gone. Plainttf brought this action
against the Pullman Palace Car Company for its value.
it was shown on trial that defendant ',ad two servants in the car
during the night in order that none of the passengers' effects might
be stolen ; that they watched in turn ; that when one of them
relieved the other about 3.3 o A. M. (two hours before Austin was
reached) the valise was in its ,lace; that no one left the car before
it reached Austin ; that several passengers left before plaintiff,
taking with them their valises : and that defendant's servants could
not tell whether one of them took plaintiff's valise or not.
On these facts the court held that the company was not liable for
the loss of the valise, applying the rule that although it was defendant's duty to use reasonable care in guarding the property of
passengers from thieves while they slept, yet that high degree of
care applicable to carriers generally did not apply to a sleeping car
company. - "Circumstances might arise which would call for the
exercise of more than usual or reasonable diligence on the part of
the employes in guarding the effects of the sleeping passengers.
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But there was nothing in the condition and circumstances existing
on the coach when at Austin which made it the duty of the servants
to inspect and identify the baggage which the passengers carried
with them. It is simply a question whether the servants exercised
reasonable care in not observing the taking of the valise under the
circumstances then existing, and this, we conclude, could be
properly resolved in the affirmative from the evidence." Several
previous cases in Texas were to the same effect : Car Co. v. Pollock,
69 Tex. 121 (1887) ; Car Co. v. Jfalhews, 74 Tex. 654 (18S 9 );
Stevenson v. Pull.Pal. Car Co., 26 S. W. 112 (1894).
The view has been advanced that the liability of a sleeping car
company for the baggage of its passengers is that of an innkeeper
for personal effects. This was held in the case of Pull. Pal. Car
Co. v. Love, 28 Neb. 239 (1889), and this position was supported
by an ably written article by Hon. Samuel Maxwell, in the American Law Review, Vol. XXVII, p. 24. However, it is difficult to
support this contention upon principle, since none of the recognized incidents of an innkeeper's situation are to be found in the
case of a sleeping car company, such as a lien on baggage fbr the
charges, etc. It may be definitely said that, at the present date,
the position of the Nebraska court is untenable, and that to support a recovery from the sleeping car company negligence on the
part of the latter's servants must be proven. See Carpenterv. N.
Y., N. H and Hart. R. R., 124 N. Y. 53 (1891) ; Pull. Pal.
Car Co. v. Gavin, 93 Tenn. 53 (1893) ; Pul. Pal. Car Co. v.

Smnith, 73 Ill. 360 (1894); Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 617 d.
Negligence will not be presumed on the part of the sleeping car
company from the mere loss of the baggage; there must be a
prima fade case of negligence on the part of the company's employes: Tracy v. Pull. Pal. Car. Co., 67 How Pr. 154 N. Y.
(1884) ; Pull. Pal. Car. Co. v. Gaylord, 6 Ky. Law Rep. 279

(1884).
However, the sleeping car company must have a watchman in
the car to protect the valuables of the passengers, or else the burden of proof will be upon it to show that it was not negligent.
This rule was first laid down by a per curian decision of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Pull. Pa!. Car Co. v. Gardner, 3

Pennyp. 78, 1882), and has been consistently followed. The
court said: "A duty rests on the company to provide reasonable
care and precaution against the valuables of a passenger being
stolen from his bed or from the clothes on his person

.

.

.

.

Unless a watchman is kept constantly in view of the centre aisle of
the car, larceny from a sleeping passenger may be committed
without the thief being detected in the act." See in accord with
this view W~oodruffSleep. Car Ca. v. Die/, 84 nd. 474 (1882);
Lewis
N. Y.
B. &R. R.,

v. N. Y. Sleep. Car Co, 143 Mass. 267 (1887) ; Root v.
Cent. Sleep. Car CO., 28 Mo. App. 199 (1888) ; Wilson v.
0. R. R., 32 Mo. App. 682 (1889); Carpenter v. V Y.
124 N. Y. 53 (1891)-
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THE INHERITANCE TAX IN ENGLAND.
The rather extravagant
language of brief of appellant, in the Illinois Direct Inheritance
Case, quoted by Mr. Landreth in this number of the LAW REGISTER,
to the effect "that such a policy, that the possibility of the exercise
of such a power, [as that of taxing inheritances] would take away
all incentive to labor, shake society to its very foundations, and
destroy our civilization," leads us to remember that England is a
country the civilization of which by good judges is considered to be
in many particulars almost as high as our own, and to be of a
solidity and an "unshakenness" that will bear a good deal of
comparison with ours. In that country, the home of Adam
Smith, Richard Cobden, and Herbert Spencer, whose free trade
doctrines are thought by orthodox Pennsylvanians to be individualism run mad, not only is there an inheritance tax, but 0 populism !
O socialism! a graduated inheritance tax! The scale (see Vol. 3
Chitty's English Statutes, 1894, Title Death Duties, p. 131) provides
for the payment of a tax of i per cent. on an estate of Zioo, of 4
per cent. on £1,0,000, 5 per cent. on 650,ooo and so on up to 8"
per cent. on £6i,ooo,ooo. This means that an estate of $io,ooo,000 or $12,000,000, such as some we have in Philadelphia, would
have to pay nearly a nillion dollars to the state. And the British
Constitution still endures.
BURCHINELL V. BENNETT, 52 Pac. (Colo.) 51, Jan. io, 1898. In
this case the puzzling IItrust-fund" doctrine has again come to the
front under very interesting circumstances.
The San Francisco
Tea Company, doing business in Denver, had as its board of
directors Mrs. Donnelly, her daughter, and her son-in-law, and
was indebted to the first-mentioned on a promissory note for $5ooo,
the consideration for which was not stated in the case. The concern getting into difficulties, Mrs. Donnelly transferred all her
stock and resigned her directorship. Immediately afterwards she
received a mortgage of all the stock of the company to secure the
note held by her, and went into complete possession and control of
the business. To use the language of the learned court, "on these
circumstances alone, and without aay, other proof of fr'aud or had
faith, the transaction is attacked" by the other creditors. The
mortgaged property was levied on, and in an action by Mrs.
Donnelly to recover possession, the lower court rendered judgment
for the plaintiff. The court of appeals, in affirming the judgment,
repudiated the 'trust find" doctrine, and ignored totally the
circumstances under which the mortgage was created. In deciding
that a corporation may deal with its assets like an individual, reliance
was placed on four cases decided outside of Colorado.
qoo- v.
Blair, 133 U. S. 534 (1889), did not raise aquestion of preferences.
Henderson v. -d.
)ust CO., 143 Ind. 561 (1895), conceded the
right of a corporation to prefer its crelitors. Gottlicb v. ARiler.
154 I11. 44 (1895), expressly denies the right of directors to gain
any advantage through a preference, and the last case relied on,
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Richardson'sEx'r v. Green, 133 U. S. 30 (1889), deals with the
right of an officer of a corporation to enforce bonds obtained by
him before insolvency, as follows: "A court of equity will, refuse
to lend its aid to their enforcement unless satisfied that the transaction was entered into in good faith, with a view to the benefit of
the company, as well as of its creditors, and not solely with a view
to his own benefit."
These citations are not all fully in harmony
with the decision of the principal case, for while Mrs. Donnelly
was not at the time either a stockholder or director, yet in the
language of the court she had ceased to be "just prior to the execution of the security " The decision might have been placed on
entirely safe ground if the court had avowedly adopted the English
rule as laid down An re !f-'Dcham Shi-Bui1iitng, Btc., Co., 9 Ch.
Div. 309 (1878), where the preference of directors is fully approved,
but that it did not intend to adopt the English rule is shown by its
recognition of the fact that a preference would be invalid if "there
be some element of bad faith or fraudulent preference, or the transac/jon is betweenpersons who sustain a filucia;y .e'atiou to the company under circumstances which ought to preclude them from
asserting the preference, and who have taken advantage of the
situation to their own benefit."
But Mrs. Donnelly's entire good
faith and want of fiduciary relation were never questioned-were
not even noticed by this court. For further discussions and citations of cases concerning the " trust fund " doctrine, see THE
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER AND REVIEW for February 1893, p. 175;
May 1894, p. 402; and July 1895, p. 448.

